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Abstract
Although neural activity often reflects the processing of external inputs, intrinsic fluctuations in activity have been observed
throughout the brain. These may relate to patterns of self-generated thought that can occur while not performing goal-
driven tasks. To understand the relationship between self-generated mental activity and intrinsic neural fluctuations, we
developed the New York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q) to assess the content and form of an individual’s experiences
during the acquisition of resting-state fMRI data. The data were collected as a part of the Nathan Kline Rockland Enhanced
sample. We decomposed NYC-Q scores using exploratory factor analysis and found that self-reported thoughts clustered
into distinct dimensions of content (future related, past related, positive, negative, and social) and form (words, images, and
specificity). We used these components to perform an individual difference analysis exploring how differences in the types
of self-generated thoughts relate to whole brain measures of intrinsic brain activity (fractional amplitude of low frequency
fluctuations, regional homogeneity, and degree centrality). We found patterns of self-generated thoughts related to
changes that were distributed across a wide range of cortical areas. For example, individuals who reported greater imagery
exhibited greater low frequency fluctuations in a region of perigenual cingulate cortex, a region that is known to participate
in the so-called default-mode network. We also found certain forms of thought were associated with other areas, such as
primary visual cortex, the insula, and the cerebellum. For example, individuals who reported greater future thought
exhibited less homogeneous neural fluctuations in a region of lateral occipital cortex, a result that is consistent with the
claim that particular types of self-generated thought depend on processes that are decoupled from sensory processes.
These data provide evidence that self-generated thought is a heterogeneous category of experience and that studying its
content can be helpful in understanding brain dynamics.
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Introduction
Intrinsically driven neural activity is a fundamental property of
the nervous systems of many different species, including humans
[1,2]. The structure of these intrinsic fluctuations in activity can be
characterized by imaging techniques such as functional connec-
tivity analysis of resting-state functional magnetic resonance
imaging (rs-fMRI) data [3]. Although studies have demonstrated
a relationship between mental processes and neural fluctuations by
modulating the internal state [4–6], the relationship to naturally
occurring self-generated thought remains less well defined [7].
Here, we consider the possibility that the temporal dynamics of rs-
fMRI data are associated with the patterns of self-generated
thought that different individuals experienced at rest. At least in
humans we know that individuals vary in their experiences over
time (for reviews see [8,9]) and that self-generated thoughts with
no relation to perceptual input are correlated with changes in
neural operation [10–14]. The current study set out to develop a
questionnaire on the content of self-generated thought that could
be used to explore the relationship between on-going thought and
variations in the rs-fMRI signal.
The association between experiential reports and changes in
intrinsic neural activity can be understood in the context of two
broad theoretical positions on self-generated thought and its neural
correlates. One is that an assembly of regions focused on the
medial surface of the posterior and prefrontal regions, commonly
known as the ‘default-mode network’ [15,16], play an important
role in self-generated thoughts, as has been indicated by a number
of studies showing activity in this system during states such as
daydreaming, mind wandering, and other forms of self-generated
mental experience [13,14,17]. Alternatively, evidence has shown
that multiple networks recruited in the service of an external task
showed coordinated activity during the resting-state [3,18]. More
generally, recent component process accounts of self-generated
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experience suggest that it is the result of the interaction of multiple
different systems [7].
For example, prior work suggests at least two ways in which
neural processes may contribute directly to self-generated experi-
ence. Certain neural processes may contribute directly to the
occurrence of this experience, by supporting particular content or
forms of mental content. For example, integrity in self-generated
thought may depend on the capacities to buffer and sustain
cognition, which are thought to allow self-generated cognition to
form a coherent train of thought [8,13,19–21]. Alternately, neural
systems may contribute indirectly to self-generated thought, for
example, because they compete with processes that are more
directly implicated in the state. Studies have found that the
processing of sensory information is reduced during self-generated
thought, a process known as perceptual decoupling [11,21]
suggesting that competition occurs between on-going sensory
input and self-generated thought. Reduced neural activity in
sensory regions could, therefore, facilitate greater integrity in a
self-generated thought [7,21] (though see [22] for an alternative
perspective).
The aim of this study was the development of a retrospective
measure of the content of the self-generated thoughts that
participants experienced and to explore its relationship to the
brain at rest. To this end we created a self-report assessment of the
content and form of an individual’s self-generated thoughts and
incorporated this instrument into the Enhanced Nathan Kline
Institute - Rockland Sample (eNKI-RS). The eNKI-RS is a large-
scale community-ascertained lifespan neuroimaging study that
employs deep phenotyping and data is openly shared as it is being
acquired (http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/enhanced/).
Immediately after finishing the scanning session, participants
completed the New York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q), a
self-report measure of the content and form of the thoughts they
experienced during the scanning session. Using exploratory factor
analysis (EFA), we identified a number of subscales for the NYC-Q
that described the patterns of self-generated that participants
experienced at rest. Next we used these scores to guide the results
of three whole-brain analyses of the rs-fMRI data: fractional
amplitude of low frequency fluctuations (fALFF), regional homo-
geneity (ReHo), and degree centrality (DC). Each of these
complementary analysis methods characterizes a different aspect
of brain function, and thus allows us to explore different types of
associations between self-generated thoughts and intrinsic neural
activity. fALFF quantifies the power of low-frequency blood
oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) fluctuations (which drive func-
tional connectivity measures [23]) relative to the power of
fluctuations at all other measured frequencies, and has been
interpreted as a normalized (for physiological noise) measure of the
local, intrinsic low frequency oscillations (LFO) of the BOLD
signal (e.g., [24,25]). ReHo measures the correlation between the
activity of a voxel and its neighbours, and can be taken as an index
of local functional coherence [26]. DC is a graph-theoretic
measure of network structure based on connectivity between
voxels, and has been used previously to identify brain regions that
act as highly-connected ‘‘functional hubs’’ [27]. For each measure,
we identified significant clusters of voxels associated with scores on
each NYC-Q subscale. Following [28] we then used these clusters
as seeds in a functional connectivity analysis, which allowed us to
interpret the membership of each cluster within the context of
large-scale functional networks at the group level.
Two broad perspectives guided our theoretical analysis of the
link between our self-report measure and the dynamical behaviour
of the brain at rest. If the default-mode network is the primary
neural contributor to self-generated experience, then correlations
between the content and form of experience with fALFF, ReHo,
and DC should be restricted to regions within this network.
Alternatively, if the behaviour of many different networks
contributes directly, or indirectly, to different elements of self-
generated thought, then associated changes in intrinsic neural
processes should not be constrained to regions within the default-
mode network. Although these results may not specify in precise
detail the neural processes that contribute to a specific aspect of
self-generated thought, they would shed light on the more general
question of the widespread nature of neural processes that
contribute to self-generated thought, and would also provide
preliminary evidence that the dynamical behaviour of the brain at
rest can in principle be illuminated through an examination of the
thoughts that occur during the same period.
Methods
Participants
166 participants (102 females; ages 18–60, 1st quartile: 23.25,
median: 39, 3rd quartile: 50.75) were recruited as part of the NKI
Enhanced Rockland Sample (eNKI-RS)[29]. Although the eNKI-
RS includes younger and older participants, only those between 18
and 60 years old were considered for our subsample. This criterion
limits the variance introduced by very young and very old
participants. As a community representative sample, the eNKI-RS
has minimal exclusion criteria, and thus includes participants
meeting criteria for one or more DSM-IV-TR Axis 1 diagnoses.
Within our subsample, 85 participants (51.2%) met criteria for at
least one such diagnosis at some time during their life, which is
comparable to the lifetime risk reported by the largest US survey
to date (50.8% at age of 75 years – see [30]). Complete
information about psychiatric diagnoses in our sample can be
found in the File S2. The inclusion in our analysis of data from
participants with psychiatric diagnoses allowed us to sample from
people with a wide range of mental experiences, though
examination of how these experiences may differ due to diagnostic
status is beyond the scope of this study. Out of the initial sample,
MRI data for only 124 participants were available at the time of
the analysis. Three of those had missing or corrupted data,
resulting in a final MRI sample of 121 datasets (80 females; age:
18–60, 1st quartile: 23, median: 40, 3rd quartile: 49).
Ethics Statement
Institutional Review Board Approval was obtained for this
project at the Nathan Kline Institute (Phase I #226781 and Phase
II #239708) and at Montclair State University (Phase I
#000983A and Phase II #000983B). Written informed consent
was obtained for all study participants.
The New York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q)
The New York Cognition Questionnaire (NYC-Q) is a self-
report tool that assesses thoughts and feelings experienced while
performing a particular activity. It consists of two sections, the first
containing questions about the content of thoughts, the second
containing questions about the form that these thoughts take. The
NYC-Q is an elaboration of a prior measure known as the
thinking component of the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire
(DSSQ; see [31]), a measure which we have successfully used to
discriminate neural processes associated with self-generated
thought in terms of both electroencephalographic measurement
[12] and pupillometry [32]. Our primary aim was to extend this
measure to encompass elements of self-generated thought that
have been studied in the literature but that are not addressed in
the DSSQ. For example, individuals differ in the content of self-
Brain’s Architecture and Self-Generated Thoughts
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generated thoughts, including their tendency to engage in mental
time travel to the future and past [33–35], whether their thoughts
are positive or negative [36], and how their thoughts relate to
themselves and others [37]. The DSSQ already contains several
items that address these content differences (marked by an asterisk
in Figure 1), and we developed additional items to provide a more
comprehensive account of each content type. Questions from the
original DSSQ and these new content questions were grouped and
presented as the first section of the NYC-Q. For each question
subjects were asked to indicate how well each statement described
their thoughts on a scale from 1 (‘‘Completely did not describe my
thoughts’’) to 9 (‘‘Completely did describe my thoughts’’).
In addition to differences in content, studies have shown that
participants can differ in the form of self-generated thoughts they
engage in: whether they are based on imagery or words [38] and
whether they are orientated towards a specific goal [37]. To
examine differences in the form of thought, we developed eight
questions that are focused on three dimensions: imagery, words,
and goal-directed. These questions were presented as the second
section of the NYC-Q. The questionnaire used in the current study is
available in the Supplementary Materials (Protocol A in File S1),
and online at https://github.com/NeuroanatomyAndConnectivity/
NYC-Q.
All 166 subjects completed the questionnaire at the end of MRI
scanning session (see below for protocol details). One of the
questions, ‘‘Q10 - I thought about an event that may take place
later today’’, was included in the questionnaire accidentally and
was removed from the analysis due to its similarity to question
‘‘Q19 - I thought about something that could still happen today’’.
The remaining questions (from all 166 subjects) were decomposed
using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to find interpretable
latent components. This analysis was applied to each of the two
sections of the NYC-Q separately. The number of factors to
calculate was estimated using Parallel Analysis [39] a data-driven,
permutation based approach that does not require subjective
judgement by the researcher. Factors were estimated using
principal axis factor analysis. The question answers were not
normally distributed (see Figures A and B in File S1), but principal
axis estimator is particularly robust to non normal input variables
[40]. We also used the oblimin rotation [41], which allow for
oblique (i.e., non-orthogonal) factors. Individual-level scores were
calculated using the method developed by ten Berge et al., [42].
This approach belongs to a family of exact (also known as refined)
score methods (as oppose to coarse score methods) and works by
obtaining a weight matrix W transforming individual-level
question scores into individual-level factor scores. There are
multiple alternative ways to define such matrix - the main
difference between the two classes of methods is that the coarse
score methods use selected salient items from the item coefficient
matrix to perform the transformation instead of all items. In
addition to using all items the ten Berge method estimates the
matrix W in such way that correlations between individual-level
scores are constrained by the correlations between the factors.
Since we used the oblimin rotation which allows latent variables can
be oblique, the method to calculate individual-level factor scores
had to be able to preserve correlations between factors. To
encourage future collaborative improvement of NYC-Q as well as to
promote transparency of our methods, the raw subject scores, the R
Figure 1. Factor loadings on the questions from the first section of the NYC-Q describing the content of self-generated thoughts.
Questions (rows) were decomposed into factors (columns) using Exploratory Factor analysis. Factors were named based on subjective interpretation
of the loadings. Weights (how much each question contributes to each factor) are represented both numerically as well as on a colour scale.
Questions adapted from DSSQ are marked with an asterisk.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097176.g001
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code used to perform EFA, and the questionnaire itself are available
online at https://github.com/NeuroanatomyAndConnectivity/
NYC-Q.
MRI data acquisition
All data (including the MRI scans) were collected as part of the
eNKI-RS data sharing initiative [29]. The following scans were
acquired for each participant (in a single 1 h long session):
1. MPRAGE (TR=1900 ms; voxel size = 1 mm isotropic)
2. Resting-state fMRI (TR=645 ms; voxel size = 3 mm isotropic;
duration = 10 minutes)
3. Resting-state fMRI (TR=1400 ms; voxel size = 2 mm isotro-
pic; duration= 10 min)
4. Resting-state fMRI (TR=2500 ms; voxel size = 3 mm isotro-
pic; duration= 5 min)
5. Diffusion Tensor Imaging (137 direction; voxel size = 2 mm
isotropic, duration = 6 min)
6. Visual Checkerboard Stimulation (TR=645 ms; voxel si-
ze = 3 mm isotropic; duration = 2.5 min)
7. Visual Checkerboard Stimulation (TR=1400 ms; voxel si-
ze = 2 mm isotropic; duration = 2.5 min)
8. Breath Holding (TR=1400 ms; voxel size = 2 mm isotropic;
duration = 10 min)
During the resting-state fMRI (rs-fMRI) scan, participants were
instructed to: ‘‘Keep your eyes open and stay awake’’ before each
resting-state scan. Eyes open was chosen over eyes closed to
prevent subjects from falling asleep. During the scan a fixation
cross, white on black, approximately 4 degrees visual angle was
presented, to discourage eye movement.
A computerized version of the NYC-Q was administered at the
end of the whole MRI scanning session. For MRI analysis we used
the MPRAGE scan and the rs-fMRI scan with a TR=2500 ms.
This data was chosen due to the procedural proximity (,21
minutes instead of 26 or 36 minutes) of its acquisition to the
administration of the questionnaire. The subjects were instructed
to consider thoughts from the whole hour-long scanning session
when filing in the questionnaire.
MR data processing
Preprocessing. Cortical surface reconstruction was per-
formed on the T1-weighted scans using FreeSurfer 5.1 [43–52]
followed by iterative manual inspection and correction of the
cortical segmentations.
The first four volumes of each EPI sequence were removed to
insure that the analysed data had reached T1 equilibrium. This
was followed by slice-timing and motion correction using AFNI
[53]. X, Y, Z displacement as well as the three axis rotations were
used to calculate the mean frame displacement (FD), character-
izing movement of each participant during the scanning session
[54]. These estimates were later used at the group-level to account
for subject specific head motion. An affine transformation from
mean EPI image to T1 volume was calculated using BBRegister
[55]. Whole brain, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and white matter
(WM) masks were extracted from the FreeSurfer parcellation and
transformed into EPI space (thresholded at 0.5 after interpolation).
Principal components of physiological noise were estimated using
the CompCor strategy [56]: time series from WM and CSF masks
as well as voxels of highest variance were used to extract two sets of
principal components (also known as aCompCor and tCompCor).
Outliers in the EPI sequence were discovered based on intensity
and motion parameters (ArtDetect - http://www.nitrc.org/
projects/artifact_detect/). This was followed by denoising of the
time series using a general linear model (GLM) with motion
parameters, CompCor components, and outliers as regressors
(note that global signal was not removed). Residual time series
were spatially smoothed with 5 mm full width half maximum
(FWHM) isotropic kernel (using FSL). Finally the time series were
bandpass filtered (0.1 Hz ,f ,0.01 Hz) using FSL (however, for
the fALFF analysis the full spectrum data has been used).
A nonlinear transformation from T1 to MNI template (created
from 152 subjects, 1 mm, provided with FSL) was calculated for
individual T1 images using ANTs [57]. This transformation was
combined with the EPI to T1 transformation to warp the EPI
volumes to standard MNI space (with resampling to 2 mm to save
storage space and processing time). This process was applied to
both band-passed and full spectrum images (for the normalization
factor used when calculating fALFF, see below). Additionally,
band-passed images were resampled to 3 mm to reduce the
memory requirements of DC calculations.
First level analysis. For each individual, three derivatives
were calculated: fractional amplitude of low frequency fluctuations
(fALFF), regional homogeneity (ReHo), and degree centrality
(DC). fALFF is the ratio of the amplitude of fluctuations within a
frequency band (0.01–0.1 Hz in our case) to the amplitude of
fluctuations within the full spectrum of frequencies [25]. The full
spectrum was naturally limited by the sampling frequency (TR)
and the scan length resulting in the range of 0.003(3) –0.2 Hz.
ReHo measures how similar the time series of each voxel is to their
immediate neighbours, indicating local synchrony [26]. DC
quantifies how many connections each voxel has to all other
voxels (a connection is defined as correlation value higher than
95% of all pairwise non-self correlation values) [27]. All individual
derivative maps were z-scored to allow for group analysis.
Group analysis. Voxel-wise univariate GLM analyses were
performed using the derivative scores (fALFF, DC, and ReHo) as
dependent variables and fit using separate models for each
derivative. Independent variables included factor scores from both
sections of the questionnaire as well as age, mean FD [54,58], and
sex. The following contrasts were tested: test for positive and
negative correlation of each derivative with each of the factors
separately, as well as past vs. future factors and negative vs.
positive factors (see Results for names and interpretations of all
identified factors). To ensure that individual-level data existed for
each voxel included on the group-level, the analysis was spatially
restricted to the union each individual’s whole-brain masks
(estimated from EPI using AFNI). Since interpretation of BOLD
outside of grey matter is problematic we also applied a grey matter
mask (derived from a probabilistic atlas bundled with FSL).
We also performed two additional analyses: one without the
motion covariate on the group level, and one where factors from
the two sections of the questionnaire were fit using two separate
models (therefore not accounting for their shared variance). We
present those results in Figures C and D in File S1.
Inference was performed by deriving suprathreshold clusters
(cluster forming threshold of z . 2.3) and calculating the
probability of the size of each cluster given the estimated
smoothness of the image, cluster forming threshold, and search
volume within the Gaussian Random Field [59] parametric
framework. The threshold used to decide which clusters are
significant was set to p,0.05 and corrected for the two-tailed
nature of the contrasts and the number of derivatives (fALFF,
ReHo, DC) resulting in pa =0.05/2/3=0.0083(3). Considering
that fALFF, ReHo, DC were all derived from the same timeseries
data, questions arise as to whether they are fully independent
measures. As such, Bonferroni correction may be too strict, and
Brain’s Architecture and Self-Generated Thoughts
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could lead to excessive Type II errors. Therefore, we also
considered a more lenient cluster size threshold of pa=0.025, a
value that does not account for the number of derivatives we
included, although does control for the number of voxels tested.
Clusters revealed using the exploratory threshold are indicated
and should be carefully interpreted in the context of prior results
because of their potential to result from Type I error.
Post hoc seed analysis. To investigate how the regions
identified by our analysis relate to other areas of the brain, for each
participant we extracted the average time series from each
significant fALFF, ReHo, and DC cluster (obtained either using
the multiple comparison corrected or exploratory threshold) and
calculated whole-brain correlation maps for each seed (seed-based
analysis similar to one performed in [28]). Correlation maps for
each subject were then Fisher’s r-to-z transformed and used in a
voxel-wise one-sample t-test to calculate group-level patterns of
connectivity.
All software workflows were defined in Nipype [60], prepro-
cessing was done using Brain Imaging Pipelines (https://github.
com/INCF/BrainImagingPipelines); fALFF, ReHo, and group-
level analyses were calculated using pipelines from the C-PAC
(http://fcp-indi.github.io/) software package. All code is available
on https://github.com/NeuroanatomyAndConnectivity/NYC-Q.
Results
Latent Factors in the NYC-Q
The factor decomposition analysis revealed a total number of
eight factors describing the content and form of self-generated
thoughts. Parallel analysis indicated that the first section of the
questionnaire would be best described by five factors, and the
second section by three factors. Factor models for both sections
revealed good fits: chi squared (131, n= 166) = 234.17, p,6.3e-10
and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) =
0.075 (95% CI 0.055–0.083) for the first section, and chi squared
(7, n = 166) = 20.11 p,0.0053 and RMSEA=0.109 (95% CI
0.054–0.162) for the second section. Factors for the first section
explained 53% of the variance, and factors for the second section
explained 52% of the variance.
By examining questions that load highly on a given factor, we
were able to name and interpret each factor. From the first section,
we identified factors for thoughts about the past (Past), thoughts
about the future (Future), positive thoughts (Positive), negative
thoughts (Negative), and thoughts about close social relationships
(Social Cognition). From the second section, we identified factors
for thoughts in the form of words (Words), thoughts in the form of
images (Images), and the specificity of thought (+Vague/-Specific).
Factor loadings are presented in Figures 1 and 2. Distributions of
each factor loadings across subjects are presented in File S2.
Partial and full Pearson correlation analysis of age, head motion
(mean FD) and factors revealed a number of noteworthy
relationships (see Figure 3). Older participants reported greater
specificity in their thoughts. Thinking about the past correlated
positively with thinking in words as well as images, but negatively
with thinking about the future and positive thinking. This is
consistent with prior studies indicating that unhappy mood is
linked to past-related thoughts [35,36]. Thinking in words and
images correlated with most of the five factors derived from the
first section of the questionnaire, although thinking in images was
not significantly related to negative or social thought. Participants
whose thoughts were also less specific and more vague reported
negative thoughts. Head motion was not correlated with any of the
derived thought domains.
It is also worth noting that positive and negative thinking was
not perfectly anticorrelated. Neither was thinking about the future
and thinking about the past. This seemingly counterintuitive fact
can be explained by the nature of the measurement. The
questionnaire is asking about thoughts across an hour-long session
and therefore it is not unlikely that participants could think both
about future and past as well positive and negative events. If we
were using thought probes to look at individual thoughts it would
have been more likely that a single thought would be reported
either positive or negative, but not both at the same time.
Additionally subjects could have been thinking about the present
or neutral events which would yield similar result.
Neuroimaging Findings
We begin the presentation of the neuroimaging results by
looking at patterns of resting-state measures that are consistent
across the population. This analysis was performed without taking
into consideration their relation to NYC-Q factors. One-sample t-
tests of fALFF, ReHo, and DC maps revealed higher ReHo values
in posterior cingulate cortex (pCC) and medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) and higher fALFF values in pCC (Figure 4), these regions
form what is known as the core DMN. This group analysis,
therefore, shows that these elements of the DMN play a role in
brain activation at rest, which is consistent with the literature [15].
Analysis of the relation of rs-fMRI data the identified question-
naire factors revealed a number of regions (Figures 5 and 6) and is
discussed in detail below. All contrasts are available in the
NeuroVault database http://neurovault.org/collections/16/. Co-
ordinates and statistical parameters of all significant clusters are
described in Tables 1 and 2.
Fractional Amplitude of Low Frequency Fluctuations. A
number of brain regions correlated with either lower or higher
degree of low frequency fluctuations. Thoughts about the past
were associated with a cluster of voxels in the right mPFC that
exhibited lower fALFF (Figure 5A). Functional connectivity from
this region presented a pattern with large clusters in both mPFC
and pCC — the two key hubs of the default-mode network. We
Figure 2. Factor loadings on the questions recovered from the
second section of the NYC-Q describing the form of self-
generated thoughts. Questions (rows) were decomposed into factors
(columns) using Exploratory Factor analysis. Factors were named based
on subjective interpretation of the loadings. Weights (how much each
question contributes to each factor) are represented both numerically
as well as on a colour scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097176.g002
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also identified a region in the primary visual cortex that showed a
positive relationship between fALFF and positive thoughts
(Figure 5, Cluster B). Functional connectivity suggested its
involvement in a medial occipital network. We found a cluster
in the dorsomedial PFC that showed a negative relationship of
fALFF with positivity of thought (Figure 5C). As with past-related
thought, functional connectivity with large clusters in the pCC and
mPFC was observed. Negative thoughts, by contrast, were
associated with greater fALFF in a region of the cerebellum
(Figure 5D) which was found to be functionally connected to both
the thalamus and a region in the mid cingulate cortex. Two
clusters in the left and right caudal posterior cingulate had lower
fALFF the more participants characterized their thoughts as being
in the form of words (Figure 5E). Functional connectivity from this
region was observed with the hippocampal formation and a region
of dorsal mPFC. In addition, fALFF in the right paracingulate
gyrus was found to positively correlate with thinking in the form of
images (Figure 5F). Functional connectivity analysis indicated a
default-mode network-like pattern with connections to pCC and
the medial temporal lobe.
Using a more lenient threshold, we found a number of
additional clusters. This analysis revealed a fALFF cluster in the
left temporal occipital fusiform gyrus that was associated with
thinking more about past than the future (Figure 7A). We also
identified a region of posterior insula in which lower fALFF was
associated with social cognition, and subsequent analysis indicated
that this was functionally coupled with superior temporal and
supramarginal gyrus, as well as regions of somatosensory and
motor cortex (Figure 7B). We found a region of mid insula that
exhibited greater fALFF with greater social cognition (Figure 7C).
Functional connectivity from this region was observed with the
insula (bilaterally) and a region of the anterior cingulate, and
exhibited relatively less connectivity with somatosensory and
motor areas compared to the connectivity of cluster depicted on
Figure 7B. Greater specificity (and at the same time lower
vagueness) of thought was associated with greater fALFF in a
region of the right angular gyrus that was functionally coupled to
pCC and lateral regions of parietal and occipital cortex
(Figure 7D).
Regional Homogeneity. We found evidence linking a
change in local synchrony of several brain regions with the
content and form of SGTs. Thoughts about the future were
associated with lower ReHo in the inferior division of the left
lateral occipital cortex (Figure 6A). Functional connectivity
analysis suggested that this region participated in a network
encompassing bilateral aspects of the visual cortex. We also
observed a cluster comprising parts of the cerebellar vermal and
paravermal regions I–VI (Figure 6B) that had greater ReHo for
individuals who reported high levels of social cognition. This
cluster was proximal to the fALFF associated with negative
thought, and was also functionally connected to the thalamus and
a region in the midcingulate cortex. Additionally we identified a
region in primary visual cortex that exhibited higher ReHo in
participants who described their thoughts as more vague than
specific (Figure 6C). Functional connectivity analysis indicated that
this region participated in similar medial occipital network as we
observed from cluster shown on Figure 5B.
At the more lenient p,0.025 threshold we found associations
between negative thoughts and reduced ReHo in the supramar-
ginal gyrus (Figure 8A and B). Seed-based connectivity indicated
that this region was functionally coupled to a large region of
sensorimotor cortex and a region of the posterior insula.
Degree Centrality. Change in terms of whole brain
connectivity was correlated only with one factor and only for
one brain area. Using the more lenient p,0.025 threshold, we
found that past related thought was associated with less DC in the
cerebellum (Figure 9A). Seed-based connectivity indicated that this
area was linked to the thalamus, a region of lateral occipital cortex
and a dorsal region of prefrontal cortex.
Discussion
Our study set out to develop a questionnaire to identify patterns
in the content and form of self-generated thought that individuals
experience at rest, and to relate these to the dynamic patterns of
neural behaviour that occur during an rs-fMRI scanning session.
To this end, we created a measure of cognition, the NYC-Q, and
decomposed this using exploratory factor analysis. We identified
several different categories of self-generated thought related to
both their content (social cognition, future, past, positive, and
negative) and form (words, images, and specificity). We used these
categories of experience to guide three methodologically different
whole-brain analyses, which revealed regions whose intrinsic
behaviour was differentiable along the dimensions of reported
experience. We discuss the nature of the components of self-
generated thought determined by our decomposition of the NYC-
Q and consider their neural correlates in relation to prior work.
Finally, we explore the implications of our results for theoretical
perspectives on the brain basis of self-generated thoughts.
The New York Cognition Questionnaire
Our decomposition of the NYC-Q allows insight into the
internal structure of self-generated thought. Importantly, our
findings are broadly consistent with the results of recent studies
that used experience sampling during a laboratory task. For
example, Ruby and colleagues [36,61] decomposed the contents of
multiple experience sampling questions and found that past and
future related thought were independent categories of experience.
Although the decomposition of the NYC-Q revealed distinct
positive and negative elements to thought, Ruby and colleagues
[36] found a single dimension of thought anchored at one end by
Figure 3. Partial (lower diagonal) and full (upper diagonal)
Pearson correlations between age, head motion and estimated
factors of the NYC-Q. Numbers and colours represent r values.
Significant correlations (two-tailed p = 0.025) are marked with an
asterisk.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097176.g003
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Table 1. Location and statistical parameters of clusters obtained using the multiple comparison corrected threshold.
Cluster Derivative Size [vox] P(size|H0) Peak [z] Max [mm] Centre of Gravity [mm]
X Y Z X Y Z
5A fALFF 702 0.0000868 4.44 10 46 24 8.59 52.8 2.16
5B fALFF 636 0.000805 3.67 8 294 4 4.62 278.3 4.78
5C fALFF 1185 0.0000025 4.45 34 46 38 13.3 52.6 18.2
5D fALFF 347 0.00426 3.68 8 250 216 22.76 261.6 219.2
5E(right) fALFF 344 0.00662 4.59 12 254 10 11.8 252.6 9.86
5E(left) fALFF 552 0.000198 4.62 214 248 6 214 257.4 4.76
5F fALFF 345 0.00781 4.18 4 50 0 2.91 47.1 0.847
6A ReHo 287 0.00348 4.58 246 274 26 241.3 275.8 25.07
6B ReHo 282 0.00513 3.4 28 262 212 2.25 258.6 214.9
6C ReHo 350 0.00176 4.22 216 272 24 23.3 284.7 23.16
Cluster labels correspond to Figures 5 and 6.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097176.t001
Table 2. Location and statistical parameters of additional clusters obtained using the liberal threshold the more liberal threshold not corrected for the number of derivatives.
Cluster Derivative Size [vox] P(size|H0) Peak [z] Max [mm] Centre of Gravity [mm]
X Y Z X Y Z
7A fALFF 283 0.0199 3.79 224 260 210 226.2 (61.5 (8.18
7B fALFF 290 0.0189 4.05 44 (34 12 50.7 (37.1 14.9
7C fALFF 326 0.00958 4.98 46 (8 (4 45.1 (6.13 (0.726
7D fALFF 294 0.0112 3.93 40 266 50 45.2 261.6 43.6
8A ReHo 217 0.0187 3.87 212 236 70 211.4 234.5 69.4
8B ReHo 234 0.0119 4.5 212 238 72 212.2 234.6 71.6
9A DC 240 0.0241 3.88 21 278 227 23.7 270.4 226.1
Cluster labels correspond to Figures 7, 8 and 9.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097176.t002
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negative experiences, and at the other by positive experiences.
Certain differences are inevitable between retrospective and online
measures of experience [8], however, both approaches indicate a
broadly consistent internal structure to the content of self-
generated thought: (i) a clear distinction between past and future
temporal foci and (ii) a further distinction between positive and
emotional valence. In terms of form, we found dimensions of
verbal and visual thoughts that were anti-correlated (r=2.17).
Inner speech and imagery are thought to be two distinct
components of experience [62] and prior work has also found
that these dimensions are negatively related during experience
sampling studies [63].
We also noted a number of relationships between the
dimensions of content and form that are broadly consistent with
prior findings. We found that future thought was more strongly
correlated with verbal thought (r= .34) than was past thought
(r= .24). Prospection thought was also more positively correlated
with words than images (r= .24). Together, these results are
consistent with Stawarczyk et al., [63] who found future thought
was positively related to verbal thought, perhaps because of the
role that language plays in planning our future [64]. We also found
that past thought was negatively correlated with positive thought,
and this is consistent with prior studies indicating that unhappy
mood is linked to past-related thoughts [35,36,65,66]. Although
research on the internal structure of self-generated thought is still
in its infancy, it is encouraging that our decomposition maps well
with prior findings in this domain.
Neural correlates of the content of the New York
Cognition Questionnaire
Our study identified the neural correlates of content differences
in self-generated thought; in particular their temporal, emotional
and social features. Both positive and negative correlations
between rs-fMRI derivatives and questionnaire factors were
investigated. The interpretation of negative correlations has been
problematic in terms of functional connectivity. Even though we
also discuss positive and negative correlation, those are not directly
related to functional connectivity but the relation between
behaviour and fALFF or ReHo measurements. In the context of
our study both negative and positive correlations indicate that the
neural processes in a particular brain region are informative of (i.e.
can predict) the self-reported content of experience. These results
could occur for multiple reasons — for example decrease of fALFF
(in case of a negative correlation) could arise because of upstream
inhibition by other regions. Recently Etkins and colleagues applied
trans cranial magnetic stimulation to the dorso-lateral pre-frontal
cortex to demonstrate that this region exerts a controlling
influence on fALFF activity in the medial pre-frontal cortex
[67]. Ultimately, answering the question of what neuronal
processes are responsible for less variable BOLD signal (fALFF)
and decrease in local synchrony (ReHo) in the context of mind
wandering remains open and may require techniques beyond
fMRI. Whether the behaviour of a neural regions is positively or
negatively related to the content, or form, of experience is
important in determining the possible process that underlies any
relationship and we consider these in detail in the section on
implications. With these limitations in mind we consider our
findings in light of prior work on different aspects of self-generated
thought.
Past/Future. Increasing reports of past-related thought were
associated with decreased fALFF in a region of the mPFC. States
of mind wandering or daydreaming, are normally characterized by
a greater focus on the future than the past, a relationship that has
been observed in countries including the United Kingdom, the
United States [34,68,69], Belgium, Germany [36,70], and China
[71]. It is interesting to note that people who tended to report
forms of experience that tend not to be common in today’s society
exhibited reduced low frequency fluctuations in a core region of
the default-mode network (the mPFC).
ReHo in a right lateral region of occipital cortex was associated
with less future thought. In an adjacent region fALFF was higher
for individuals who reported greater past than future thought.
Together, these data suggest that neural activation in left lateral
occipital cortex is reduced and less cohesive for individuals who
engaged in future related thoughts. Studies suggest that future
thought is common under situations when attention need not be
paid to visual input [32] and the reduced ReHo in lateral visual
cortex, coupled with the reduction in fALFF in an adjacent region
could reflect the relative unimportance of immediate sensory input
in self-generated thoughts about the future (see section on
Implications).
Positive/negative emotions. We also found neural corre-
lates for emotional aspects of self-generated thought. Positive
experiences showed increased fALFF in a region that participated
in a medial occipital network, and decreased fALFF in a region of
dorsal mPFC. Several recent meta-analyses have shown that the
visual cortex is activated during states of positive affect [72,73] and
this evidence supports our finding that this region is involved in
positive mental content at rest. Moreover, the medial occipital
Figure 4. Spatial distribution of fALFF, ReHo, and DC measures
across subjects. Each map was obtained from a one sample t test,
converted to z values and thresholded ad Z= 10 (for visualisation
purposes). The bottom row features the data inferred mask used in the
group analysis. pCC and mPFC show high ReHo values and mPFC show
high fALFF values. Those are the major hubs of DMN which suggests
that even without relating the measures to the questionnaire results
DMN plays an important role in brain activation at rest.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097176.g004
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cortex plays a direct role in imagery [74], and so it is informative
that we found a correlation between positivity and imagery factors
of the NYC-Q at the group level. Positive thought was also
associated with reduced fALFF in a region of dorsal medial pre-
frontal cortex. This region of cortex has been associated with
appraisal and expression of negative emotion (for a review see
[75]) perhaps because it is important role in conscious threat
appraisal [76]. This perspective provides convergent support for
our finding that fluctuations in dorsal-medial pre frontal cortex
activity are relatively strong for individuals who report an absence
of thoughts with positive features (such as calmness).
Negative thoughts, by contrast, were associated with changes in
fALFF in regions of the cerebellar vermal and paravermal regions
V and VI. This cerebellar clusters had a functional connectivity
pattern indicating an association with the thalamus and the
anterior cingulate, areas activated together with cerebellar areas
during cardiovascular arousal [77,78] and negative emotional
processing [79]. It is important to note that connectivity changes in
the lower cerebellar regions VII-X could not have been detected,
as those regions were excluded due to only partial coverage in
some of the subjects (see group mask in Figure 4), thus obscuring
the possible contribution of vermal and lateral cerebellar areas to
other emotional functions [79,80].
Social. Social cognition was associated with changes in the
fractional amplitude of low frequency fluctuations (fALFF) in the
insula: less fALFF was found in a posterior cluster and greater
fluctuations were seen in a cluster in the mid-insula. Functional
connectivity analysis indicated that both of these regions covaried
with a network including the caudal anterior cingulate, regions
which together form a network often described as the saliency
network [81,82]. However, relative to the anterior region, the
posterior cluster was distinguished by its greater connectivity with
regions of the somatosensory and motor cortices.
The insula is an important hub in the brain [83] that allows for
the integration of affective and feeling states [84]. Anterior regions
of the insula have been hypothesized to be important in social
cognition because it allows the affective and somatosensory
simulation of the affective states of other individuals, as occurs
during states like empathy [85,86]. Such simulation is not thought
to involve the posterior regions of the insula because they receive
Figure 5. Significant fALFF clusters (A–F), scatterplots showing relation between dependent variables (mean fALFF values) and
contrast scores (questionnaire factors), and networks obtained by seeding with the corresponding cluster. All derivatives have been z
scored. All scatter plots represent the whole population (n = 121). Note that only clusters that passed the conservative multiple comparison corrected
threshold are shown in this figure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097176.g005
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projections directly from primary somatosensory and motor
regions that are important for somato-sensation, but not for
simulation related to these states [87]. Our data is, therefore,
generally supportive of the role of the anterior insula in social
cognition, because individuals reporting such experiences exhib-
ited a shift in the locus of low frequency fluctuations from the
posterior towards the anterior regions. Social cognition was also
associated with greater ReHo in similar cerebellar vermal and
paravermal regions V and VI as it was linked to negative thought.
Importantly social and negative thought were uncorrelated at the
group level.
Neural correlates of the form of self-generated thought
We also found neural correlates associated with individual
differences in the form of self-generated thought, as described
below:
Images/words. Prior investigations suggest that thoughts in
imagery are often the dominant form of mental experience during
Figure 6. Significant ReHo clusters (A–C), scatterplots showing relation between dependent variables (mean ReHo values) and
contrast scores (questionnaire factors), and networks obtained by seeding with the corresponding cluster. All derivatives have been z
scored. All scatterplots represents the whole population (n = 121). Note that only clusters that passed the conservative multiple comparison corrected
threshold are shown in this figure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097176.g006
Figure 7. Additional fALFF clusters found using the more liberal threshold not corrected for the number of derivatives. From left to
right: location of the clusters (A–D), scatterplots showing relation between dependent variables (mean fALFF values) and contrast scores
(questionnaire factors), and networks obtained by seeding with the corresponding cluster. All derivatives have been z scored. All scatterplots
represents the whole population (n = 121).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097176.g007
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the resting state [69,88]. We identified a region in the perigenual
cingulate cortex associated with greater thoughts in the form of
images. Functional connectivity confirmed this region’s participa-
tion in the default-mode network, suggesting a role for this
network in aspects of self-generated thought related to mental
imagery.
A region of the right and left caudal posterior cingulate cortex
exhibited lower fALFF for individuals who rated their experiences
as related to words. Our functional connectivity analysis suggests
that this region has extensive connections to the hippocampus, the
pCC as well as the dorsomedial PFC, although it lacked the strong
coupling to the ventro medial PFC that is characteristic of the
default-mode network. The involvement of the hippocampus in
the default-mode network is a matter of debate [89,90], however,
studies suggest that this structure is involved in processes of
episodic memory and spatial navigation (for a meta-analysis see
[91]), which together are thought to depend on the process of
scene construction [92]. Further research will be needed to
ascertain why the region of the caudal posterior cingulate cortex
exhibits less fluctuation at rest for individuals whose thoughts are
verbal in nature.
Specific/Vague. Studies have shown that participants tend
to report self-generated thoughts that are often specific in nature
[69]. Our data found an area of the right angular gyrus that
showed greater fALFF for individuals who characterized their
thoughts as specific rather than vague. Functional connectivity
demonstrated that this region overlapped with the posterior
cingulate, yet had a dorsolateral rather than medial focus in the
prefrontal cortex that would be characteristic of the default-mode
network. This network is similar to the fronto-parietal control
network [93]: a neural system that is important in engaging
controlled processing across a wide range of different external tasks
[94]. Our data could reflect the engagement of control on self-
generated thoughts, a process which could facilitate the process of
buffering and sustaining that would help support a detailed
internal train of thought [7]. This hypothesis is supported by
evidence that participants who have greater capacity for control
[20,95,96] engage in more self-generated thoughts under non-
demanding conditions and that these are often goal-focused [37].
By contrast an individuals whose thoughts were vague, rather than
specific, exhibited greater neural changes in regions of the medial
occipital cortex. This supports the notion that sensory information
can compete with internally focused information and so prevent a
detailed and specific train of self-generated thought from emerging
(see Implications section for further discussion).
Implications for a neural account of self-generated
experiences
Our data found evidence of the importance of the default-mode
network during the resting state. At the group level we found that
the pCC exhibited both high amplitude fluctuations, as measured
by fALFF, and exhibited highly homogeneous neural behaviour,
as assessed by ReHo. Likewise, the mPFCs neural behaviour was
relatively homogeneous. These data suggest that across our sample
the two key hubs of the DMN exhibit behaviour during the resting
state that is cohesive. The pCC exhibited high levels of temporal
variation in the low frequency range. We also found evidence that
the behaviour of regions likely to participate in the default-mode
network contained information on the content of an individual’s
experience at rest. For example, regions in the perigenual
cingulate exhibited greater fALFF for individuals reporting high
Figure 8. Additional ReHo clusters found using the more liberal threshold not corrected for the number of derivatives. From left to
right: location of the clusters (A–B), scatterplots showing relation between dependent variables (mean ReHo values) and contrast scores
(questionnaire factors), and networks obtained by seeding with the corresponding cluster. All derivatives have been z scored. All scatterplots
represents the whole population (n = 121).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097176.g008
Figure 9. Degree Centrality cluster found using the more liberal threshold not corrected for the number of derivatives. From left to
right: cluster location, scatterplot showing relation between dependent variables (mean Degree Centrality values) and contrast scores (questionnaire
factors), and the network obtained by seeding with the cluster. All derivatives have been z scored. All scatterplots represents the whole population
(n = 121).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097176.g009
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levels of imagery and aspects of the dorsomedial pre-frontal cortex
exhibited less activity for individuals whose thoughts did not have
a positive tone.
The neural correlates that differentiated individuals in terms of
the nature of their self-generated experiences were often in regions
that are not members of the canonical default-mode network, such
as the visual cortex, the parietal cortex, the cerebellum, and the
insula. Some of these regions may directly contribute to the form
or content of self-generated experience. Meta-analysis, for
example, has shown that the occipital cortex is activated during
positive thought [72,73]. The relation between greater fALFF in
the medial occipital cortex and greater positive thought is
consistent with this finding (Figure 5B). It is also possible that
the association between social cognition and fALFF in the mid-
anterior insula reflects a direct role of feelings and affective states
in generating thoughts about the self and others (Figure 7C)
[85,86].
A large number of the neural correlates we found reflected
negative correlations with different aspects of experience. These
types of relationship may reflect competition between many
different cortical regions to produce the relatively narrow aspects
of conscious experience. For example, an assumption that has
grown to prominence in theoretical accounts of self-generated
thoughts is that for consciousness to focus inwards in a detailed
manner, external input must release its grasp on attentional
processes. This phenomenon is known as perceptual decoupling [7].
Studies using electroencephalography (EEG) demonstrate that the
cortical processing of on-going input is reduced during self-
generated thought [10–12], in part because of a reduction in the
phase locking in the occipital cortex [97]. Based on studies in
anesthetized monkeys, it has been shown that the BOLD signal is
governed by local field potentials [98]. Based on this mechanism, it
is possible that reduced coherent neural activity and lower
amplitude activity in the BOLD signal could underlie the reduced
cortical processing of sensory information as indexed using EEG
that occurs during self-generated thought. In theory, this would
help people focus in a detailed manner on self-generated mental
events [7], and so could explain the reduction in ReHo medial
aspects of occipital cortex for participants whose thoughts were
specific rather than vague. It could also account for the relative
absence of cohesive neural fluctuations in the medial occipital
cortex for individuals whose thoughts were highly specific. Future
work that links the electrical information provided by the electro-
encephalographic with the BOLD signal provided by fMRI could
plausibly illuminate the mechanisms through which intrinsic and
extrinsic sources of information interact to produce different forms
of conscious experience.
Altogether, our data demonstrate that the relation between the
neural changes taking place during the resting state and aspects of
self-generated thought is complex. We found that regions could
either be correlated or anti-correlated with the content or form of
self-generated thought. Moreover, these neural correlates were
distributed across many regions of cortex, rather than being
limited to only one functional network. Just like many brain
networks exhibit intrinsic coordinated activity at rest [3,18], many
may also be associated with the thoughts and feelings that unfold
during the resting-state.
Limitations and future directions
One important caveat of our results is that an association
between neural and psychological changes does not provide
definitive information on the mechanisms that contribute to any
underlying relationship. Our analysis adopted an individual
difference approach and so exploited variation across participants
as a proximal measure of different forms of experience. Using only
a single session of rs-fMRI data, it is impossible to determine
whether any association between psychological and neural
domains relies on a trait that encourages the expression of that
particular type of thought indirectly, or is instead related to the
processes that directly reflect the experience itself. Nor does the co-
occurrence of change within a psychological domain provide
information on what function it plays. There are likely numerous
sub processes that underpin a complex psychological state such as
having thoughts about the future, governing the specificity of its
content, or whether its form was in imagery or words.
Furthermore, several rs-fMRI scans were acquired in our protocol,
and our analyses only included the final scan, even though the
questionnaire asked about thoughts during the whole hour-long
scanning session. This selection was made to minimize the time
between scanning and retrospective reports, and also to use the
scanning sequence that is most common in fMRI studies. It is
possible that our analysis would have greater power if participants
were presented with the questionnaire directly after the rs-fMRI
scan and instructed to limit their reports just to that period of time.
This adjustment would increase temporal precision regarding
when the experiences occurred and therefore is recommended for
future experiments. It is also known that experiences systematically
change over the course of an experimental session[99,100] and so
it is possible that certain aspects of our results would be different if
we had analysed the first rather than the last resting-state scan. For
these reasons, while our decomposition of the NYC-Q demon-
strates that there are multiple forms of self-generated thought, and
their relation to the resting-state indicates differentiable neural
correlates, the precise nature of these mind-brain relationships will
require further research. It is likely that examination of the quality
of thoughts with different measures, or in different groups or
situations, may well yield different patterns of covariance at the
neural or subjective-level, and thus a different pattern of results.
An appropriate inference to draw from our data is that because we
show distinct patterns of experience with reliable neural correlates,
self-generated experiences are not a single homogeneous class of
mental or brain states, however, the specific neural correlates that
we find must be considered as hypotheses that will guide future
research, and should not be viewed as definitive accounts of the
neural basis of different aspects of the experience.
It is worth noting that in contrast to seed-based functional
connectivity [3] and dual-regression methods [101], the analyses
we performed did not require a priori assumptions about the
specific brain regions or networks involved. Moreover, each of the
measures we used (fALFF, ReHo, and DC) provided different, but
complementary information about aspects of underlying neural
processes, and together they provide an exploratory picture of the
complex way in which self-generated experience may map onto
intrinsic changes in the brain.
The three measures we used to investigate the temporal
behaviour of the BOLD signal at rest exhibited differential
sensitivity to our measure of self-generated thoughts. In terms of
number and statistical significance, fALFF outperformed ReHo
and that in turn did better than DC. It is an open question as to
why some measures performed better than others, but one of the
characteristics of DC that distinguishes it from other measures is its
global nature. fALFF and ReHo are local measures — in the sense
that they are using each voxel data (or each voxel’s immediate
neighbours) independently of each other. DC, on the other hand,
takes into account pairwise connections between all voxels. The
relatively poor sensitivity of DC in our study might indicate a local
rather than global (distributed) nature of the neural correlates of
the content and form of self-generated thoughts. It is, however,
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important to note that the relative sensitivity of the derivative to a
particular aspect of cognition depends both on the power of the
derivative as well as the nature of the targeted neural process. As
we currently do not know how to independently determine the
relative spatial scope of the neural processes that are important to
self-generated thoughts, it is premature to draw firm conclusions
on the relative merits of the techniques we applied in the current
investigation.
Finally, we developed the NYC-Q as a tool to measure
experience retrospectively. It adds to growing body of similar
resources including the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire [31],
the Amsterdam Resting State Questionnaire [102] (which has a
well developed factor structure and high test-retest reliability), and
the Resting State Questionnaire [88]. The retrospective nature of
these measures all have the advantage of allowing an individual’s
thoughts to be estimated without interrupting the stream of
consciousness or the collection of physiological data. However, the
reliance of all of these measures on memory leads to the concern
that biases in recall may reduce their accuracy. In addition to
pursuing neural correlates that these tools reveal, we recommend
that an important goal for their further development should be
their comparison to online techniques that rely less on memory,
such as experience sampling (see [8] for a review of these issues).
This technique involves interrupting individuals to identify the
current contents of thought, and has been used in task-based
contexts to illuminate the neural correlates of self-generated
thought [13,14,103]. It would be useful to identify the overlap
between experience sampling indices of the content of thought and
the NYC-Q because this would help determine whether the two
measures could be used in an interchangeable fashion. Such an
experiment would involve interrupting a participant using
experience sampling probes and asking questions about the
content and form of thoughts immediately preceding the probe
[36]. The questions would be a shorter version of the ones used in
the NYC-Q. At the end of the rest period the NYC-Q would be
administered and results from the thought probes collected during
the rest period would be compared with the answers to the
questionnaire. As we anticipate that addressing this and related
questions in a comprehensive manner would benefit the larger
cognitive neuroscience community, we have provided our
questionnaire online at https://github.com/NeuroanatomyAnd
Connectivity/NYC-Q to foster a more integrated and collabora-
tive approach to further investigating this research question.
Conclusions
Our study found that the content of self-generated thought as
measured by the NYC-Q had a consistent structure and that the
relationship between these different types of thoughts and neural
activity at rest extended across many different regions of cortex.
We also found that it was characterised by both positive and
negative associations with neural processes. Given the complexity
and richness of human experience during the resting-state, it seems
plausible that its most likely neural correlate will not to be found in
a single neural system. Instead our study suggests that a form of
experience with such variety is more likely to arise through the
complex interplay of brain regions distributed across the cortex, as
well as perhaps multiple large-scale networks. We encourage
further exploration of the distinct role of the default-mode
network, as well as those of other large-scale networks, in different
aspects of self-generated experience.
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